Abstract The Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) county-level insurance product is analyzed for cotton producers in Texas. In contrast to studies based on representative farms, this analysis uses actual farm-level yield data, which allows one to observe the heterogeneity of STAX effectiveness across farms in a county. The findings indicate that, for most farms, STAX is not a very effective alternative to farm-level crop insurance. However, contrary to observed behavior, the findings suggest that many cotton producers in Texas would benefit from using STAX as a complement to their farm-level crop insurance.
the deductible on an underlying farm-level yield protection (YP), revenue protection (RP), or revenue protection with harvest price exclusion (RP-HPE) policy.
Area-level crop insurance products have existed since the early 1990s (Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997) . However, for any given insured unit, growers have previously had to choose either a farm-level product or an area-level product. The same acreage could not be insured with more than one federally-facilitated insurance product. With the 2014 farm bill introducing the shallow loss products, two crop insurance products can now be purchased for the same acreage: an underlying farm-level YP, RP, or RP-HPE product, and a shallow loss, area-level, STAX or SCO product.
The research presented here evaluates STAX for cotton producers in Texas (for additional information on STAX, see Risk Management Agency 2016). Unlike previous studies based on representative farms, this analysis uses actual farm-level yield data to evaluate the performance of STAX both as a complement to an underlying farm-level RP policy and as a stand-alone insurance product. This approach allows one to observe the heterogeneity of STAX effectiveness across farms.
Prior to 2015, the area-level insurance products offered through the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) were based on county yield estimates from the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). However, NASS generally only reports yield estimates for counties with considerable production of a given crop located in states that also have considerable production of the same crop. This restricted the counties where area-level insurance products could be offered. The fact that an area-level insurance product for a given crop could not be offered in many counties where the crop was produced was not a major concern prior to 2015 because relatively few farmers purchased area-level insurance. With the introduction of the STAX and SCO shallow-loss products, the lack of NASS yield data for many crops/counties became a significant problem because, by statute, STAX and SCO were to be offered wherever YP, RP, and RP-HPE were available. This was an even greater concern for cotton than for other crops because, as a result of changes introduced in the 2014 farm bill, STAX was now the primary mechanism for providing federal support to cotton growers.
Rather than having some STAX and SCO policies based on NASS yield data and other STAX and SCO policies based on another estimate of county yield (due to the lack of NASS county yield estimates), the USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA), which administers the FCIP, decided to cease basing area-level insurance products on NASS data. Instead, for each combination of crop, county, and irrigation practice, yield data collected from farm-level YP, RP, and RP-HPE policies would be used to generate a unique county yield estimate that would be used for all RMA-administered, arealevel insurance products for that combination of crop, county, and irrigation practice.
Premium subsidies are, respectively, 65% and 80% for SCO and STAX. Due to the elimination of some other types of federal support for cotton growers and the high premium subsidy for STAX, analysts expected most cotton growers to purchase STAX. However, this has not been the case. In 2016, only 2.54 million acres of cotton were insured under STAX (RMA 2017a) . This was only 25.2% of the NASS estimate of cotton planted acres Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy (NASS 2017) . In some states, STAX participation was even lower. For instance, STAX was purchased on only 19.5% of Texas cotton-planted acres in 2016 (RMA 2017a and NASS 2017) . Such low levels of participation suggest that many cotton growers are not convinced that they will benefit from purchasing STAX.
Federal Crop Insurance
For cotton YP, RP, and RP-HPE policies, guarantees are based on the "Actual Production History" (APH) yield. The APH is the average of annual crop yields for the last 4 to 10 years on the insured unit. YP protects against yield losses due to natural causes such as drought, excessive moisture, hail, wind, frost, insects, and disease. Insured producers choose the coverage level (from 50% to 85%) and the price selection (between 55% and 100% of the projected crop price). The product of the APH yield and the coverage level is the trigger yield. If the actual yield is less than the trigger yield, an indemnity is paid equal to the product of the yield shortfall and the price selection on each insured acre.
RP and RP-HPE are both revenue insurance products protecting against revenue shortfalls. For RP-HPE, the trigger revenue is the product of the coverage level selected by the insured and the expected revenue (the product of the APH yield and the projected price). With RP, the trigger revenue increases if prices increase during the growing season. For both RP-HPE and RP, when the actual revenue (product of actual yield and harvest price) is less than the trigger revenue, an indemnity is paid equal to the difference between the trigger revenue and the actual revenue on each insured acre. Most cotton growers choose to purchase RP rather than YP or RP-HPE. In 2016, 81% of the cotton acreage insured under farm-level policies was in RP (RMA 2017a).
For some crops and counties, the FCIP also offers area-level insurance products that trigger indemnities based on yield or revenue shortfalls at the county level. For the Area Yield Protection (AYP) product, indemnities are triggered when the county yield for the insured crop falls below the trigger yield (the product of the expected county yield and the coverage level selected by the insured). Similarly, the FCIP offers Area Revenue Protection (ARP) and Area Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion (ARP-HPE) products that differ from the analogous farm-level products in that the expected and actual yields used in the expected revenue and actual revenue calculations are measured at the county level. For cotton, participation in these area-level products has been quite low. For 2016, only 316 acres of cotton were insured nationally under AYP, ARP, or ARP-HPE (RMA 2017a).
The SCO and STAX products introduced in the 2014 Farm Bill are unique in that they allow growers to layer an area-level insurance product on top of an underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy. While conceptually similar, there are some important differences between SCO and STAX. For instance, STAX (but not SCO) can also be purchased without an underlying farm-level policy. STAX coverage is always revenue-based, whereas SCO coverage is either yield-or revenue-based, depending on whether the underlying farmlevel policy is yield insurance or revenue insurance. Another important difference is that the premium subsidy for STAX is 80%, whereas the premium subsidy for SCO is only 65%. Given this difference in premium subsidy, it is not surprising that in 2016 only 11,295 cotton acres were insured under SCO compared to 2.54 million acres insured under STAX (RMA 2017a).
STAX coverage begins at 90% of the expected county revenue and extends down to the greater of either 70% or the coverage level on any underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy. An indemnity is triggered when county revenue falls below 90% of its expected level. For example, if a STAX purchaser also purchased a YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy at the 75% coverage level, STAX would cover losses between 90% and 75% of the expected county revenue. Alternatively, if a STAX purchaser also purchased a YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy at the 65% coverage level, STAX would cover losses between 90% and 70% of the expected county revenue. Likewise, if a STAX purchaser had no underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy, STAX would cover losses between 90% and 70% of the expected county revenue.
Area-level Insurance
Relative to farm-level insurance products, area-level products are far less susceptible to the asymmetric information problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. This advantage occurs because indemnities are triggered by shortfalls in the county yield or revenue rather than the farm yield or revenue. While insureds can potentially engage in hidden actions that would affect the farm yield or revenue, there is no reason to believe that they can significantly affect the county yield or revenue. Likewise, while insureds may have access to hidden information (that is, not available to the insurer) regarding the expected yield or revenue on the farm, it is unlikely that they would have access to hidden information regarding the expected county yield or revenue (Miranda 1991; Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997) .
The disadvantage of area-level products is that they are subject to basis risk. In this context, basis risk refers to less than perfect dependency between farm yields and county yields. As a result, farm-level losses may not be fully covered by an area-level insurance product (Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997; Barnett et al. 2005; Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov 2007) . In areas with more homogeneous soil and climatic conditions, basis risk is likely to be lower because farm yields are more highly correlated with county yields (Miranda 1991; Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet 1994; Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997) .
Various studies have explored the optimal design of area-level insurance contracts (Miranda 1991; Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet 1994; Mahul 1999; Vercammen 2000; Bourgeon and Chambers 2003; Mahul and Wright 2003) . Other studies have compared the risk reduction effectiveness of area-level insurance with that of farm-level insurance (Miranda 1991; Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet 1994; Barnett et al. 2005; Deng, Barnett and Vedenov 2007) . Due to their recent introduction, few studies have focused on area-level shallow-loss products. Dismukes et al. (2013) analyzed how the purchase of such products would affect the optimal coverage for underlying farm-level crop insurance products. These authors found that subsidized area-level, shallow-loss insurance products have some potential for causing producers to reduce coverage levels for underlying farm-level crop insurance. Luitel, Hudson, and Knight (2015) analyzed the impact of shallow-loss products (SCO or STAX) on cotton growers' risk management Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy decisions in Texas. Since the 2014 Farm Bill allowed separation of STAX coverage by practice, the authors examined whether irrigated and non-irrigated growers would increase or decrease RP coverage levels in 2015 (when STAX was first available) compared to their coverage level decision in 2014. These authors' findings suggested that cotton producers would tend to decrease (increase) RP coverage levels for irrigated (non-irrigated) cotton. Using a simulation approach (nonparametric distributions of yields for a representative farmer in each U.S county), Cooper, Hungerford, and O'Donoghue (2015) examined the interaction of area-level, shallow loss products and traditional farm-level crop insurance for corn, winter wheat, and soybeans. These authors also found evidence that the use of highly-subsidized, arealevel, shallow-loss products would reduce optimal coverage levels for underlying farm-level insurance. Paulson, Schnitkey, and Kelly (2017) analyzed the marginal benefit of adding SCO to an underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policy for a representative central Illinois corn farm. These authors found that the marginal expected utility benefits of an add-on SCO policy were relatively small and due mostly to capturing additional subsidy dollars rather than additional risk reduction.
To summarize, previous research has emphasized that area-level crop insurance products have the benefit of limited exposure to moral hazard and adverse selection but can leave policy-holders exposed to basis risk. The literature on subsidized area-level shallow loss products is still quite limited but findings to date suggest that the expected utility benefits of such policies are due primarily to the high levels of subsidization and that purchasing such products may reduce optimal coverage levels on underlying YP, RP, or RP-HPE policies. This study extends the literature on area-level shallow loss insurance products by analyzing the certainty equivalent impacts of STAX purchasing for cotton producers in Texas. In contrast to previous studies, which have generally been based on representative farms, this study uses actual farm-level yield data allowing one to observe the heterogeneity of STAX effectiveness across farms. Furthermore, whereas previous studies of area-level insurance products have been based on NASS county-level yield data, this study employs county-level yield estimates that are calculated by aggregating the farm-level yields of YP, RP, and RP-HPE purchasers in the county, as RMA is now doing with STAX, SCO, and other area-level products.
Empirical Analysis
Four different scenarios were analyzed to assess the farm-level impacts of STAX. A no insurance scenario was created as a baseline. The second scenario assumed that farmers purchased only an RP policy. The third scenario assumed that farmers purchased only a stand-alone STAX policy with no underlying RP policy, while the fourth scenario assumed that a STAX policy was layered on top of an underlying RP policy (STAX as a complement to RP).
The farm-level yield data used in the study were obtained from RMA. The data are 10-year yield histories from 1999 to 2008 that were used to establish APH yields for 2009 purchasers of farm-level yield and revenue insurance policies.
1 Futures market price data were also obtained for the same years as the yield data.
The empirical analysis focused on farms in Texas for irrigated and nonirrigated cotton production. In 2016, Texas accounted for 56% of U.S. planted cotton acres (NASS 2017). All farms with less than the full ten years of actual yield data were deleted. In each county, farms were segregated by irrigation practice (irrigated or non-irrigated). Counties with less than 25 farms which met the requirement of having a full ten years of actual yield data for that irrigation practice were also deleted. The remaining data, which were used for the analysis, included 9,141 non-irrigated cotton farms and 5,841 irrigated cotton farms. We do not have 2009 acreage data for these farms, but based on their acreage from 1999-2008, we estimate that these farms account for well over 90% of the 2009 Texas cotton-planted acreage for both irrigated and non-irrigated production. The farms are located in the counties shown in figures 1 and 2.
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) county yield data for the period 1989-2008 were used to estimate a linear yield trend for each combination of county and irrigation practice (irrigated or non-irrigated). The estimated yield trend was then used to detrend the farm-level yields for each farm in the county using the specified irrigation practice.
For each farm i and irrigation practice k, the acreage a ik was fixed as the average acreage over the 10 years. This assumption allowed for the calculation of the expected farm yield l ik :
where y ikt is the detrended yield on farm i using irrigation practice k in year t.
The acreage-weighted county average yield y ckt in county c was calculated for each irrigation practice k and year t
where n is the number of farms in county c. The expected county yield l ck is calculated as
over the 10 years of available yield data.
2
For commodities that are traded on futures exchanges, the RMA uses futures market prices to establish a crop insurance projected price and harvest price. For example, for cotton produced in northern Texas (March 15 crop insurance sales closing date), the projected price is the simple average of daily closing prices on the December Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) cotton contract over the period February 1 through February 28. The harvest price is the simple average of the daily closing prices on the same contract over the period October 1 to October 31. In central Texas (February 28 crop insurance sales closing date), the projected price is the simple average of daily closing prices over the period January 15 through February 14, while the harvest price is the same as for northern Texas.
Daily price data on the December cotton futures contract were obtained for each of the 10 years for which yield data are available. For each year, the projected price and harvest price were calculated per RMA specifications for purposes of calculating the annual percentage change %D t between the projected price and the harvest price. For simplicity, we used the northern Texas %D t for all Texas counties. The projected price was set at $0.60 per pound for each year t and the annual harvest price was calculated as HP t ¼ PP t Â 1 þ %D t ð Þ , keeping in mind that %D t may be negative.
3
For each farm i and irrigation practice k, and for a given RP level of Coverage, the RP indemnity per acre is calculated as: Figure 1 Number of non-irrigated Texas cotton farms included in the analysis, by county
The actuarially fair RP premium per acre is
and the subsidized premium per acre is
where Subsidy% is the federal premium subsidy percentage for the level of RP Coverage.
For the ten years of available farm-level data, a small number of farms (less than five percent) would have received no indemnities at low (50 or 60 percent) RP coverage levels. Thus, for these farms the actuarially fair premium per acre would be zero. To address this, for each irrigation practice (irrigated and non-irrigated) we identified the 5 th percentile value of the RP actuarially fair premium per acre for 50% coverage. This value was then imposed as the minimum "actuarially fair" unsubsidized premium per acre. 4 For each county c and irrigation practice k, for a given level of RP Coverage, the STAX liability and indemnity are:
and Figure 2 Number of irrigated Texas cotton farms included in the analysis, by county
The protection factor (PF) in the STAX liability equation is a choice variable that allows for changes in STAX liability without changing the loss cost (the calculation being minimized in the STAX indemnity equation). The PF variable is bounded between 80% and 120%. Since STAX has an 80% premium subsidy, most STAX purchasers choose a PF level of 120% so they can obtain the maximum amount of STAX liability for any given level of Coverage. For this analysis, we do likewise and set PF at 120%. The actuarially fair and subsidized premiums per acre for STAX are given, respectively, by:
and
since STAX has an 80% premium subsidy. For each farm i, irrigation practice k, and year t, revenue per acre net of insurance premiums (NR) was calculated under different scenarios which vary with the type of risk protection used:
Scenario 2: Only RP insurance
Scenario 3: Only STAX insurance
Scenario 4: RP insurance layered with STAX insurance (STAX as a complement to RP)
Assuming an initial wealth W 0 of $500 per acre (to prevent negative ending wealth values), the ending wealth per acre W for each scenario was calculated by summing the revenue per acre net of insurance premiums and the initial wealth.
5 Growers are assumed to maximize a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function:
where 1 > 1 is the risk aversion coefficient (set initially at 1 ¼ 2). 6 For each insurance scenario, the expected utility and the certainty equivalent (CE) calculated over the 10 ending wealth streams for farm i and irrigation practice k are given by:
Results are generated for treatments with different combinations of assumed RP coverage level, level of CRRA risk aversion, premium structures (actuarially fair or subsidized), and unit structures (basic/optional units or enterprise units).
Results
Five sets of empirical results are presented. The first examines a standalone STAX policy (with no underlying RP policy) when premiums are calculated to be actuarially fair. The second considers a stand-alone STAX policy when premiums are subsidized. The third set of empirical results focuses on heterogeneity in STAX performance across farms and analyzes the extent to which variability in the correlation between farm yields and county yields explains the heterogeneity in STAX performance. The fourth set of empirical results evaluates STAX as a complement to an underlying RP policy when premiums are subsidized. The final set of empirical results evaluates STAX as a complement to an underlying enterprise unit RP policy when premiums are subsidized.
Stand-Alone STAX with Actuarially Fair Premiums
Table 1 displays average CE outcomes for different insurance scenarios. Results are segregated by non-irrigated and irrigated production. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
5 Costs of production other than the cost of insurance are excluded from the analysis since the insurance products being analyzed provide no protection against stochastic costs of production. 6 At the request of a reviewer, the analysis was also conducted assuming a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function. This change did not have any qualitative effects (and had only minor quantitative effects) on the empirical results, so only the results based on a CRRA utility function are presented here.
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A baseline no insurance scenario is presented in treatments 1 and 2. The CRRA coefficient is set to a level of 2 for treatment 1 and a level of 3 for treatment 2. The results for subsequent treatments presented in the table can be compared to these baseline results for the corresponding CRRA coefficient.
In treatments 3 and 4, premium rates are actuarially fair. Treatment 3 sets the CRRA level at 2 and the RP coverage level at 70%. As shown in figure 3, 70% is the coverage level most commonly selected by cotton RP purchasers in Texas. On average, for non-irrigated cotton, moving from no insurance to RP with a 70% coverage level increases the CE by $13.80 per acre, or 2.1%. For irrigated production, the average CE gain is $32.79 per acre or 3.9%. The purchase of stand-alone STAX would increase the average CE by $6.22 per acre or 0.9% for non-irrigated production, and $11.32 per acre or 1.3% for irrigated production. By comparing the CE gains from RP to those from STAX for each farm, one can determine the percentage of farms that would choose to purchase STAX as an alternative to RP. Under treatment 3, only 2.9% of the non-irrigated farms and 1.5% of the irrigated farms would choose to purchase STAX as an alternative to RP with a 70% coverage level. Treatment 4 increased the CRRA coefficient from 2 to 3 while maintaining the RP coverage level at 70%. A CRRA coefficient of 2 implies moderate risk aversion, whereas a coefficient of 3 implies a more risk-averse decision maker. Not surprisingly, CE values are lower for the higher level of risk aversion. However, CE gains when assuming the higher level of risk aversion (comparing treatment 4 to treatment 2) are greater than those when assuming the lower level of risk aversion (comparing treatment 3 to treatment 1). With the higher level of risk aversion, moving from no insurance to RP with a 70% coverage level increases the average CE by $20.28 per acre, or 3.2% for non-irrigated production. For irrigated production, the average CE gain is $50.42 per acre, or 6.2%. The purchase of stand-alone STAX increases the acreage CE by $8.95 per acre, or 1.4% for non-irrigated production and by $16.70 per acre, or 2.0% for irrigated production. Increasing the level of risk aversion also decreases the percentage of farms that would prefer STAX as an alternative to RP. Under treatment 4, only 2.7% of non-irrigated farms and 1.3% of irrigated farms would choose to purchase STAX as an alternative to RP with 70% coverage.
Stand-Alone STAX with Subsidized Premiums
Imposing actuarially fair premiums allows one to focus on CE gains due strictly to risk reduction. However, in reality, premiums are subsidized at 80% for STAX and at varying rates for RP depending on the coverage level. For the remaining treatments shown in table 1, subsidized premiums are employed. The subsidized premiums are calculated by applying the actual STAX and RP premium subsidy percentages to the in-sample, actuarially fair premiums. 
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Treatment 5 is identical to treatment 3, except that the premiums are now subsidized. The premium subsidies greatly increase the average CE gain for both RP and STAX. For non-irrigated production, the premium subsidy increases the average CE (relative to the no insurance baseline) for RP with 70% coverage by $39.33 per acre, or 6.0%. The average CE for stand-alone STAX increases by $27.74 per acre, or 4.2%. For irrigated production, the premium subsidy increases the average CE (relative to the no insurance baseline) for RP with 70% coverage by $74.86 per acre, or 8.9%. The average CE for stand-alone STAX increases by $55.49 per acre, or 6.6%. The introduction of premium subsidies also increases the percentage of farmers who would prefer STAX as an alternative to RP with 70% coverage. For nonirrigated production, 15.8% of farms would now prefer STAX, while for irrigated production 27.1% of farms would prefer STAX. This reflects the higher premium subsidy for STAX relative to RP.
Explanation of the Variation of STAX Performance
The CE results presented in table 1 are averages over all farms for the treatment and irrigation practice. However, given that the analysis is conducted using actual farm-level yield data, it is also possible to evaluate the heterogeneity of these CE results across farms-something that would not be possible with a representative farm analysis. Figures 4 and 5 present for non-irrigated and irrigated production, respectively, histograms of the treatment 3 (actuarially fair premiums), CE gains per acre for STAX relative to no insurance. Figures 6 and 7 present similar histograms for treatment 5 (subsidized premiums). The histograms reveal considerable heterogeneity across farms in the CE gains obtained from purchasing STAX.
For each treatment and irrigation practice, the farms were then sorted in ascending order by CE gains from STAX purchasing relative to the no insurance scenario. Farms below the 10th percentile and above the 90th percentile were recorded. For each of the farms in the extreme percentiles, the Pearson correlation between farm yield and county yield was calculated. An average of these correlations was then generated for each extreme percentile group. Table 2 presents the average of these correlations.
As was expected, for treatment 1 with actuarially fair premiums, the average farm yield to county yield correlations are considerably lower for the lowest 10 th percentile of CE gains from STAX purchasing relative to the highest 10 th percentile. This is particularly true for irrigated production. However, for treatment 5 with subsidized premiums, there is no difference between the average farm yield to county yield correlations for the lowest and highest 10 th percentiles. This somewhat counter-intuitive result occurs because of the impact of the premium subsidy on certainty equivalent gains for STAX. With an 80% premium subsidy, the impact on certainty equivalent gains reflects the premium subsidy far more than any risk reduction obtained from purchasing STAX. Thus, for subsidized STAX the farm yield to county yield correlation is much less important in the determination of certainty equivalent gains compared to the case of actuarially fair premiums.
To further analyze the heterogeneity in STAX benefits across farms, STAX CE gains per acre relative to the no insurance scenario were regressed against the farm yield to county yield Pearson correlation measured over the 10 years for all 9,141 non-irrigated farms and 5,841 irrigated farms. The results are presented in table 3. When premiums are actuarially fair (treatment 3), the coefficients are statistically different from zero at a 1% level of significance, indicating that the farm yield to county yield correlation does impact STAX CE gains. For both non-irrigated and irrigated production, the 
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elasticity is approximately unitary, implying that a 1% increase in the farm yield to county yield correlation is associated with a 1% increase in STAX CE gains relative to the no insurance scenario. When premiums are subsidized (treatment 5), only the coefficient for irrigated production is statistically different from zero at a 1% level of significance. However, even for irrigated production, the elasticity is only 0.17. This again demonstrates that with an 80% premium subsidy, the certainty equivalent gains from STAX purchasing are largely driven by the subsidy, rather than how correlated the farm yield is to the county yield.
STAX as a Complement to RP with Subsidized Premiums
In 2016, more than 87% of Texas cotton acreage was insured under RP (RMA 2017a and NASS 2017) . The largest share of that, over 43%, was insured at the 70% coverage level (figure 3). For comparison, the 60% coverage level had the next highest percentage of acreage insured under RP at just under 17%. Given this, we considered the question of whether growers who want additional crop insurance protection would be better off increasing their RP coverage level or layering STAX on to an underlying RP policy (purchasing STAX as a complement to RP).
Returning to table 1, treatment 6 increases the RP coverage level to 80%. Not surprisingly, increasing the RP coverage level increases the average CE from RP purchasing (compared to RP with a 70% coverage level as in Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy treatment 5). STAX results are not shown because changing the RP coverage level has no impact on stand-alone STAX. Treatment 7 presents results for STAX layered on top of an RP policy with 70% coverage. Comparing the results from Treatment 7 with those from Treatment 6, it is clear that the average CE from STAX layered on top of an RP policy with 70% coverage far exceeds the average CE from an RP policy with 80% coverage for both non-irrigated and irrigated production. In fact, all of the non-irrigated and irrigated farms in this analysis would prefer (i.e., would have a higher CE from) STAX layered on top of an RP policy with 70% coverage compared to an RP policy with 80% coverage. Even more striking is that similar results occur when STAX is layered on to an RP policy with a 60% coverage level (treatment 8). For both non-irrigated and irrigated production, the average CE for STAX layered with 60% coverage level RP is higher than the average CE for 80% coverage RP. More than 99% of the non-irrigated farms and 97% of the irrigated farms prefer STAX layered with 60% coverage level RP to RP with an 80% coverage level. For nonirrigated production, even the average CE for STAX layered on to a 50% coverage level RP policy is higher than the average CE for RP with an 80% coverage level. More than 91% of the non-irrigated farms prefer STAX layered on to a 50% coverage level RP policy to an RP policy with an 80% coverage level. For irrigated production, the average CE for STAX layered on to a 50% coverage level RP policy is slightly lower than the average CE for RP with an 80% coverage level. Still, more than 46% of the irrigated farms prefer STAX layered on to a 50% coverage level RP policy compared to an RP policy with an 80% coverage level.
Next, the CRRA coefficient was increased to 3 and subsidized RP with an 80% coverage level was compared to a subsidized RP with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX. In principle, more (less) risk-averse farmers should derive relatively less (more) utility from STAX because of the basis risk inherent in an area-based product. These findings are shown in table 1 as treatment 10 (which is identical to treatment 6, except with a higher CRRA coefficient), and treatment 11 (which is identical to treatment 9 except with a higher CRRA coefficient). As expected, the higher CRRA reduces the average CE for both RP with an 80% coverage level and RP with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX. Also, as expected, the higher CRRA coefficient decreased the average CE gain for RP with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX relatively more than it did RP with an 80% coverage level. However, for non-irrigated production, the average CE for RP with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX is still higher than the average CE for RP with an 80% coverage level. More than 87% of the non-irrigated farms would prefer an RP policy with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX to an RP policy with an 80% coverage level. For irrigated production, the average CE for RP with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX remains lower than the CE for RP with an 80% coverage level. Still, more than 35% of the irrigated farms would prefer an RP policy with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX to an RP policy with an 80% coverage level.
STAX as a Complement to Enterprise Unit RP with Subsidized Premiums
The YP, RP, and RP-HPE policies can be purchased with different unit structures. The unit structure establishes the level of aggregation at which premiums are calculated and indemnities are paid. For a given crop produced in a given county, all owned and cash-rented acreage form one "basic unit." Separate basic units are established for each landlord on share-rented acreage. Under certain conditions, basic units can be disaggregated into "optional units" or aggregated into "enterprise units." Examples of when basic units can be disaggregated into optional units include when fields are located in different sections or have different Farm Service Agency serial numbers. Enterprise units combine all of the acreage in which the insured farmer has a financial interest (owned, cash-rented, or share-rented). Generally, premium subsidy percentages for a given level of coverage are the same for basic and optional units but are higher for enterprise units.
The empirical analyses presented thus far have assumed RP policies at either the basic or optional unit level. Our farm-level yield data are from the period 1999-2008. During this period, very few farmers chose to insure at the enterprise unit level and it is not possible to retroactively determine how many of the farms in our data could have qualified as an enterprise unit. Currently, however, many Texas cotton farmers choose to insure using enterprise units (see figures 8 and 9). Thus, we reanalyzed STAX as a complement to RP assuming subsidized premiums but now also assuming that the underlying RP policies were at the enterprise unit level. The assumption of enterprise units increases the premium subsidy on the underlying RP policy. To further disadvantage STAX in the empirical comparisons, we assumed a CRRA coefficient of 3 (higher relative risk aversion).
Returning again to table 1, treatment 12 presents the average CE for subsidized enterprise unit RP at 80% coverage (the enterprise unit premium subsidy percentage at 80% coverage is 68%). Treatment 12 is identical to treatment 10 except that we are now assuming that the farm yield data are from enterprise units. For both non-irrigated and irrigated production, the average CE is higher for treatment 12 than for treatment 10 because the enterprise unit premium subsidy percentage is higher than that for basic/optional units. For Texas cotton, the highest enterprise unit premium subsidy percentage of 80% occurs for coverage levels of 50% to 70%. Thus, treatments 13, 14, and 15 layer STAX on top of an enterprise unit RP policy with a coverage level of 70%, 60%, and 50%, respectively. These treatments demonstrate that even when one assumes that all of the farms would qualify as enterprise units, average percentage CE gains are higher for RP at either a 70% or 60% coverage level layered with STAX than for RP at an 80% coverage level. Only when STAX is layered on to an RP policy with a 50% coverage level is the average CE lower than that for RP with an 80% coverage level. In this case, still more than 45% of the non-irrigated farms (but only 5% of the irrigated farms) would prefer RP with a 50% coverage level layered with STAX to an 80% coverage level RP policy.
Thus, contrary to actual observed insurance purchasing behavior, these findings suggest that more Texas cotton farmers should be layering STAX on top of their RP policies-even if the RP policy is at an enterprise unit level. If they do not want to increase the amount per acre that they are paying for crop insurance, these findings still suggest that they should consider purchasing STAX and reducing the coverage level on their underlying RP policy to 60%. 
Conclusion
This study analyzed the farm-level performance of STAX for cotton growers in Texas when the county yield is estimated using RMA yield data from YP, RP, and RP-HPE policies (as is currently the case), rather than NASS county-level yield data (as was done previously with area-level insurance products). Using 10 years of actual farm yield data for the period 1999 to 2008, certainty equivalents were evaluated under various treatments for non-irrigated and irrigated cotton production. The first two treatments are baseline no insurance scenarios assuming different CRRA coefficients. The next two treatments assumed actuarially fair premiums and compared RP purchased at a 70% coverage level to stand-alone STAX purchased as an alternative to RP. Regardless of whether the CRRA coefficient was set to a level of 2 or 3, the average CE for RP with a 70% coverage level was substantially higher than that for stand-alone STAX. Treatment 5 showed that when premiums are subsidized, RP with a 70% coverage level still generated higher average CE levels (with a CRRA coefficient of 2) than STAX purchased as an alternative to RP, though the introduction of premium subsidies substantially increases STAX CE levels relative to those of RP.
When analyzing farm-level impacts of federal crop insurance products, researchers often utilize representative farm analyses where a single hypothetical farm is considered to be representative of a region (e.g., a county). The advantage of representative farm analysis is that a longer time-series of data can generally be assembled from which to conduct parametric or nonparametric simulations. The disadvantage of representative farm analysis is that it cannot capture the heterogeneity of farm-level impacts within a region. By using actual farm yield data this study was able to demonstrate the heterogeneity of STAX impacts at the farm-level. While the analysis is limited to the 10 years of available farm yield data, the results are consistent with those from previous studies on actuarially fair area-based insurance products in suggesting that STAX performs better (worse) for farms with yields that are more (less) correlated to county yields. As an interesting extension to previous work, this study found that when the STAX 80% premium subsidy is imposed, the correlation between farm yield and county yield is far less relevant in explaining differences in STAX CE levels.
The 70% coverage level is most commonly selected by purchasers of cotton RP insurance in Texas. Given this, this study considered whether growers who want additional crop insurance protection would be better off increasing their RP coverage level or layering STAX on to an underlying RP policy (purchasing STAX as a complement to RP). When premiums are subsidized, we found that most of the Texas cotton farms analyzed would have experienced higher CE levels from purchasing RP with either a 70% or 60% coverage level layered with STAX compared to RP with an 80% coverage level. Even when enterprise unit premium subsidies were applied to RP and the CRRA coefficient was set to a level of 3, most farms still preferred RP with either a 70% or 60% coverage level layered with STAX to RP with an 80% coverage level.
Thus, these finding strongly suggest that more cotton farmers in Texas should be layering STAX on top of their RP policies. The obvious question is why so few are actually doing so. As an area-based product, STAX is very different than the RP product that most cotton farmers have purchased for many years. Furthermore, STAX was first offered only in 2015, so perhaps Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy farmers are taking a "wait and see" position while they learn about this new insurance product and evaluate its performance. A similar delayed adoption occurred when farm-level revenue insurance products were first offered in the late 1990s.
Another possible explanation is that insurance agents are reluctant to encourage their clients to purchase STAX. Since RMA establishes premium rates for FCIP products, agents cannot compete for clients based on the price of the insurance product. Instead, they compete based on the quality of advice and service provided. Agents carefully cultivate relationships with farmers over time to build a client base. They may be afraid of losing clients if they encourage STAX purchasing but then, due to basis risk, STAX does not pay indemnities when clients experience losses. Bulut (2016) hypothesizes that farmers utilize budget heuristics when making crop insurance purchase decisions. These heuristics, which may be derived from comparing crop insurance costs to the costs of other items in their production budgets, limit the amount that farmers are willing to spend per acre for crop insurance. Similarly, Du, Feng, and Hennessy (2016) find that, for corn and soybean farmers in twelve Midwestern and Great Plains states, the probability of choosing a particular insurance product decreases as out-of-pocket premium expenditures increase. This is true even though higher premium expenditures would generate higher levels of expected utility. A combination of budget heuristics and insurance agent reluctance to encourage STAX purchasing could explain why most Texas cotton farmers choose not to purchase STAX.
Regardless, the incongruity between the findings presented here and actual farmer behavior suggests the need for additional research. For example, future research could test the generalizability of the findings presented here by extending the analysis to other states and/or different time periods. Also, while this study was limited to cotton, the methods used here could also be used to analyze the performance of SCO as a complement to an underlying RP policy for various other commodities. In addition, research is needed on factors that influence farmers' understanding of, and behavioral responses to, complex insurance and farm policy innovations. Finally, it may be that observed farmer behavior reflects significant heterogeneity in risk preferences, something that is extremely difficult to account for in expected utility models of decision-making.
